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Abstract 
Under current U.S. law, taxpayers can deduct up to 100 percent of their state income 
taxes from their adjusted gross income when calculating their federal income taxes. As a 
result, Iowans currently pay approximately $251 million less to the federal government 
than they would otherwise pay. There is, however, no equivalent stipulation allowing for 
the deduction of state sales taxes. Consequently, by eliminating the sales tax and 
replacing the lost revenue with an income-based tax, Iowans could save a substantial 
amount of money on their federal tax returns without any change in revenue for the Iowa 
government. Alternatively, by replacing the sales tax with an income-based tax, the State 
of Iowa could increase its tax revenue without increasing the total tax burden on Iowans. 
This analysis discusses four specific scenarios, with net benefits to Iowans ranging from 
$106 million to $157 million per year. 
 
Keywords:  federal itemized deductions, income tax, sales tax, state budget, tax policy. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
ARE ALL TAXES EQUALLY BAD? HOW REPLACING IOWA’S SALES 
TAX COULD SAVE IOWANS MORE THAN $100 MILLION PER YEAR 
 
Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of 
the pockets of the people as little as possible over and above what it brings 
into the public treasury of the state. 
—Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 1776 
 
Introduction 
Across the nation, state budgets are in disarray. In fiscal year 2002, state revenues 
were 5.6 percent lower than forecasted, and an even bleaker scenario seems likely for 
fiscal year 2003 (The Economist 2002). Iowa is no exception to this general situation, and 
we are all familiar with the recent budget woes that have brought painful adjustments to a 
number of critical state programs, especially education. Lawmaker and stakeholder 
attention so far has taken a short-run perspective and has focused mainly on identifying 
the size and nature of the cuts needed to balance the budget. There are reasons to believe, 
however, that the budget problems currently facing Iowa and other states may not be only 
a cyclical phenomenon related to the recent slowdown and recession in the general 
economy but also may reflect deeper structural problems that require a long-run 
reassessment of both spending and revenue options. In particular, in this paper we argue 
that state governments should pay more attention to their choice of tax revenue 
instruments, and that the State of Iowa could benefit substantially from the replacement 
of the sales tax with an income tax. 
The problem of taxation, to secure financial resources needed for public expendi-
tures, has long been of interest to economists (Musgrave 1985). Issues that typically are 
addressed relate to notions of “efficiency” and “equity.” Concerns about efficiency arise 
because most taxes create distortions in the allocation of resources, such that they leave 
taxpayers with a loss that is greater than the tax revenue collected by the government.1 
Considerations of equity, on the other hand, are germane because taxpayers are 
heterogeneous on many dimensions, and their welfare may be affected differently by a 
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given tax. Equity in taxation is often understood to mean that individuals should be taxed 
according to their ability to pay. But equity considerations are also at the root of the 
principle that taxes should be levied on individuals according to the benefits they receive 
(from the public expenditures financed by taxes). Unfortunately, equity and efficiency 
considerations in taxation often lead to conflicting prescriptions. Striking a balance 
between efficiency and equity leads to the problem of optimal taxation, which is widely 
studied in economics.2 
Given the difficulties of devising and implementing outright an optimal tax structure 
in a real-world economy, the tax problem also has been formulated in terms of gradual 
changes or policy reform (Feldstein 1976). In the spirit of this approach, this paper 
articulates a specific tax policy reform that offers obvious advantages to the State of 
Iowa. Specifically, the policy change advocated is to replace the sales tax with an 
income-based tax. For a general economy, a prescription such as this need not have 
theoretical validity, and indeed it seems at odds with the general trend of most developed 
economies, as most nations have adopted a mix of tax instruments that involve both 
direct taxation (e.g., income taxes and property taxes) and indirect taxation (e.g., sales 
taxes and value-added taxes). But, in determining what is optimal for the State of Iowa, it 
is crucial to account properly for all the constraints set forth by the federal government, 
and it turns out that a feature of U.S. federal tax law provides a strong incentive for 
individual states to favor a tax system based on income and/or property taxes.  
Under current U.S. law, taxpayers can deduct up to 100 percent of their state income 
(and property) taxes from their adjusted gross income when calculating their federal 
income taxes.3 There is, however, no equivalent stipulation allowing for the deduction of 
state sales taxes. Consequently, by eliminating or reducing the sales tax and replacing the 
lost revenue with an income tax increase, Iowans could save a substantial amount of 
money on their federal tax returns without any change in revenue for the Iowa 
government. Alternatively, the Iowa government could increase revenue without 
increasing the total tax burden on Iowans. As an illustration, we can point out that Iowans 
at present already derive sizeable benefits from the federal deductibility provision: 
Iowans currently pay approximately $251.3 million less to the federal government than 
they would be required to pay if the deduction of state income taxes were not allowed.  
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In what follows, we articulate and document our proposal to replace the current sales 
tax with an equivalent income tax. Whereas our proposal produces unambiguous and 
sizeable gains to Iowans, any practical implementation of the idea underlying our 
proposal will inevitably have some distributional consequences. Thus, we cannot escape 
the trade-off between efficiency and equity of taxation, discussed earlier. Indeed, there 
are many ways to implement the tax change discussed here, each with different impacts 
on the distribution of the tax burden. Here, we concentrate on illustrating the general 
principle, and we discuss perhaps the simplest implementation of the tax change, that is, 
one based on a supplemental ad hoc flat income tax replacing the sales tax (while leaving 
unchanged the current income tax structure of the State of Iowa). We estimate that such a 
change to the Iowa tax system would produce approximately $157 million per year in 
benefits to Iowans. Furthermore, these gains would be possible without a significant shift 
in the distribution of the tax burden. 
 
Background on the Iowa State Tax System 
Iowa, like many states, relies on a variety of taxes and fees for its revenue, but the 
majority of state revenue is obtained through the individual income tax and the retail 
sales tax. The revenue generated from Iowa taxes and the relative importance of these 
taxes is shown in Figure 1. 
Individual Income Tax 
The individual income tax is based essentially on federal adjusted gross income 
(AGI) calculations. As taxable income increases through Iowa’s nine statutory income 
brackets, the marginal tax rate increases from 0.36 percent to 8.98 percent as shown in 
Table 1. The income brackets are indexed for inflation and are adjusted annually in order 
to ensure that tax rates reflect real income. Figure 2 shows that, although Iowa’s income 
tax schedule appears to be relatively progressive,4 the progressivity is lessened by the 
federal income tax deduction. Even though federal tax laws allow all state income taxes 
to be deductible, only Iowa, Louisiana, and Alabama allow all federal income taxes to be 
deductible on state tax returns. The deductibility of federal income taxes on Iowa tax 
returns has little impact on low-income taxpayers but it significantly reduces the tax 
burden, and effective tax rate, of higher income taxpayers. The result is that low-income  
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Source: Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance, November 2001. 
 
FIGURE 1. Iowa state tax revenue by source, fiscal year 2001 (millions of dollars) 
 
 
TABLE 1. Iowa’s statutory income tax rates 
Taxable Income ($) Marginal Tax Rate (%) 
0 to 1,162 0.36 
1,162 to 2,324 0.72 
2,324 to 4,648 2.43 
4,648 to 10,458 4.50 
10,458 to 17,430 6.12 
17,430 to 23,240 6.48 
23,240 to 34,860 6.80 
34,860 to 52,290 7.92 
52,290 and over 8.98 
Source: Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance, November 2001. 
 
tax liabilities remain essentially unchanged while high-income earners are able to reduce 
their taxable income. 
Retail Sales Tax 
The retail sales tax in Iowa is a tax of 5 percent on the sale of tangible goods and some 
specifically designated services.5 In order to lessen its regressivity, some items are 
exempted from  the state sales tax (for example, food and medical expenses fall in this  
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Source: Authors’ calculations. See the Appendix for details. 
 
FIGURE 2. Change in average state income tax rate due to federal income tax 
deduction 
 
 
category). Iowa law also allows for a maximum of 2 percent in additional local option 
sales taxes. One percent of the local option sales tax is designated as the regular local 
option tax, while the other 1 percent is designated as the school infrastructure local option 
tax. The regular local option tax can be imposed in cities, rural areas, or countywide and 
requires passage by general election. The school infrastructure local option tax must be 
countywide and must be repealed within ten years after it is imposed.6 It also requires 
passage by general election. 
Distribution of Income and the Tax Burden 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of income for Iowa taxpayers.7 Each bar shows the 
percentage of taxpayers whose income falls in the range specified. The State of Iowa has 
less income inequality than do most other states. This is due largely to the relatively low 
number of very high-income people in the state, which decreases the dispersion of the 
income distribution. The vast majority of Iowa taxpayers have an AGI of less than $70,000.  
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance, July 2001. 
 
FIGURE 3. Income distribution in Iowa, tax year 1999 
 
 
The incidences of the retail sales tax and the individual income tax, as a percentage 
of AGI, are shown in Figure 4. It is interesting to note that the combined sales and 
income taxes form a nearly proportional state tax system. Other state taxes, however, tend 
to make the overall net tax burden more regressive.8 
Interstate and Historical Comparisons 
Table 2 shows that Iowa and neighboring states rely on a mix of income and sales 
taxes to raise revenue. Iowa’s income tax schedule may appear to be more progressive 
than the other states, but it is important to note that the higher tax rates for higher income 
taxpayers in Iowa are partly offset by the federal income tax deductibility.9 
Over time, however, the sales tax and the income tax have undergone several 
changes. The Iowa state sales tax was first introduced in 1934 at a rate of 2 percent. The 
most recent sales tax increase occurred in 1992 and raised the rate from 4 percent to 5  
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Source: Authors’ calculations. See the Appendix for details. 
FIGURE 4. Sales and income tax incidences for Iowa, fiscal year 1999 
 
TABLE 2. The income and sales tax rates of Iowa and its neighboring states 
State 
Income Tax Rate 
(lowest-highest) 
Sales Tax 
Rate 
Iowa 0.36% to 8.98% 5% 
Illinois Flat 3% 6.25% 
Minnesota 5.35% to 7.85% 6.5% 
Missouri 1.5% to 6.0% 4.225% 
Nebraska 2.51% to 6.68% 5% 
South Dakota None 4% 
Wisconsin 4.6% to 6.75% 5% 
Source: Rates compiled by authors from data available on web pages of states’ departments of revenue. 
 
 
percent. The income tax was first introduced in 1934 and ranged from 1 percent to 5 
percent. The most recent change occurred for the 1998 tax year when all marginal rates 
were cut by 10 percent of their value. The effect of this income tax cut on the trend of the 
state’s revenue is evident in Figure 5, which shows Iowa’s gross tax collections for the 
last 16 years. Figure 6 shows the percentage of all state taxes accounted for by each tax.10 
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Source: Compiled by the authors from Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance Annual Reports (2000; 
2001a,b) 
 
FIGURE 5. Gross tax collections in Iowa, fiscal years 1986-2001 
 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the authors from Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance Annual Reports (2000; 
2001a,b) 
 
FIGURE 6. Selected Iowa taxes as a percentage of gross state tax revenue, fiscal years 
1986-2001 
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The nationwide trend for states has been an increasing reliance on sales taxes and a 
decreasing reliance on income taxes.11 Iowa’s most recent sales tax increase and income 
tax decrease fit this trend. 
 
The Value of Replacing the Sales Tax with an Income-Based Tax 
At present, Iowans pay both sales taxes and state income taxes. The basic reason to 
consider the tax change analyzed in this paper has to do with the federal deductibility of 
state income taxes (a deductibility that does not extend to sales taxes).12 To begin our 
analysis, we first look at the value of the federal deductibility of state income taxes. It 
turns out that Iowans currently pay approximately $251.3 million less to the federal 
government annually because federal law allows taxpayers to deduct state income tax 
payments from their federal taxable income.13 The distribution of these savings is shown 
in Table 3. 
On average, these savings translate to about $138 per Iowa tax return per year, but 
high-income taxpayers realize the majority of the benefits. There are two reasons why 
these benefits accrue mainly to high-income taxpayers: (i) because these taxpayers pay 
high Iowa taxes and hence the deduction reduces their federal taxable income more; and 
(ii) because, since their income is taxed at a higher rate, a given deduction is worth more  
 
 
TABLE 3. Current tax savings by Iowans per year, due to federal deductibility of 
state income tax (2002 dollars) 
AGI Bracket 
Total 
Savings ($) 
Savings per 
Return ($) 
Savings as a 
Percentage of AGI 
(%) 
Less than 10,000 43,347 0 0.00 
10,000 – 20,000 1,791,796 8 0.03 
20,000 – 30,000 6,925,659 38 0.08 
30,000 – 40,000 15,154,473 62 0.19 
40,000 – 50,000 11,312,143 83 0.20 
50,000 – 70,000 23,277,589 184 0.44 
70,000 and over 192,837,014 1,994 1.28 
All returns 251,342,020 138 0.49 
Source: Authors’ calculations. See the Appendix for details. 
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to them than it is to low-income taxpayers. Although taxpayers must itemize their federal 
tax returns in order to benefit from the deductibility of state income taxes, no taxpayer is 
hurt by the availability of this federal deduction provision. 
The fact that the federal deductibility of state income (and property) taxes is quite 
valuable to Iowans suggests that perhaps Iowa is not optimally exploiting this federal 
deductibility provision. In fact, sizeable efficiency gains are possible by retooling Iowa’s 
tax collection mechanisms, away from sales taxes and toward an income-based tax. What 
remains to be determined is the actual monetary value of this policy change. 
The Revenue-Neutral Lump-Sum Equivalent Tax 
To see how we can put a dollar value on the tax policy change analyzed in this study, 
suppose that we can observe the sales taxes paid by each taxpayer over the course of the 
tax year. Let such an amount for the ith taxpayer be labeled as iT . Now suppose that all 
sales taxes are eliminated, and that a taxpayer’s state income liability is increased by a 
lump-sum amount equal to iT  (over and above the current income tax, as per the existing 
income tax structure). What would be the consequences of such a change? Clearly, the 
government would collect exactly the same revenue from this taxpayer. As for the 
welfare of the taxpayer, note that he or she can still afford the same consumption bundle 
chosen under the sales tax system, and so from that perspective the taxpayer is equally 
well off.14 But if the taxpayer is itemizing on his or her federal return, and if the lump 
sum tax iT  were now deductible from the income subject to federal taxes, this change 
would reduce the individual’s federal tax liabilities and result in substantial savings to the 
taxpayer,15 say 0iS ³ .  
If we could compute the amount iS  saved by each taxpayer, then summing such 
nonnegative amounts over all taxpayers would provide us with a monetary estimate of the 
value of the policy change that replaces the sales tax by an individual-specific lump-sum 
tax (sometimes called a “poll tax.”). Of course, we do not have enough information to 
actually compute this amount for each and every taxpayer. But the conceptual experiment 
carried out suggests a useful approximation based on a “representative taxpayer” for each 
of the income classes that we identify (see the Appendix for details). Figure 7 shows the 
sales tax paid per return, and Table 4 shows the amount saved by itemizing under this  
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Source: Authors’ calculations. See the Appendix for details. 
 
FIGURE 7. Estimated sales tax per return in Iowa (2002 dollars) 
 
 
TABLE 4. Estimated distribution of savings, per year, from itemizing the revenue-
neutral lump-sum tax  (2002 dollars) 
AGI Bracket 
Total 
Savings ($) 
Savings 
Per Return ($) 
Savings as a 
Percentage of AGI 
(%) 
Less than 10,000 604,748 1 0.03 
10,000 to 20,000 3,350,695 8 0.05 
20,000 to 30,000 6,588,183 18 0.07 
30,000 to 40,000 10,718,909 44 0.12 
40,000 to 50,000 6,361,156 47 0.10 
50,000 to 70,000 11,489,229 113 0.20 
70,000 and over 67,197,153 554 0.42 
All Returns 106,310,073 58 0.19 
Source: Authors’ calculations. See the Appendix for details. 
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scenario. High-income taxpayers obtain the largest portion of the savings in this 
counterfactual simulation because they currently pay the greatest percentage of the sales 
taxes and have a higher marginal federal income tax rate. High-income taxpayers also are 
more likely to itemize their federal income taxes. Table 4 shows the net outcome of the 
lump-sum equivalent tax: Iowa taxpayers would gain $106.3 million dollars annually, 
when measured in 2002 dollars.16 Table 4 also shows the calculated distribution of 
savings by income bracket. Although no taxpayers would lose money, the distributional 
impact of this scenario would be that of a regressive tax cut. 
The Taxpayer-Neutral Lump-Sum Equivalent Tax 
An alternative way of valuing the policy change is to suppose that the current sales 
tax is replaced by an individual-specific lump-sum tax, the level of which is set so that 
the State of Iowa collects the revenue gains arising from the policy change. Thus, instead 
of replacing the sales tax by a lump-sum tax iT  equal to the sales tax paid by the ith 
individual, the state replaces the sales tax by a lump-sum tax iˆ iT T³ , which has the 
property of leaving the taxpayer with the same after-tax disposable income as the 
individual had under the sales tax system. In other words, the state government 
anticipates that taxpayers who itemize would get a net benefit from the policy change and 
the state adjusts the lump-sum tax accordingly. Summing the difference ( )iˆ iT T-  over all 
taxpayers again gives us a monetary value for the policy change in terms of increased tax 
revenue while leaving each and every taxpayer as well off as under the sales tax system.  
As earlier, we cannot compute the amounts ( )iˆ iT T-  for each and every taxpayer, but 
we can get a useful approximation based on the data for the representative taxpayers for 
each income class. The net result for this scenario is that the Iowa government would 
raise an additional $133.9 million annually (in 2002 dollars). Note that the estimated  
“value” of the tax change here is higher than in the preceding scenario. To understand 
why that is the case, suppose that iˆT  is initially set such that the state captures the entire 
efficiency gain estimated in the preceding scenario ($106.3 million, in the aggregate). But 
itemizing taxpayers still would have some gain, as explained in endnote 15. The state can 
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then internalize this further second-order gain, leading to the higher aggregate estimated 
value of $133.9 million.  
We need to re-emphasize that the calculations just discussed should be interpreted as 
providing a benchmark estimate of the net benefits that would flow from replacing the 
current sales tax with a lump-sum income tax. Of course, it is apparent that an individual-
specific lump-sum tax is not a feasible alternative. But the idea of an individual-specific 
lump-sum tax is useful for getting an estimate that is “conservative,” and immune, as 
much as possible, from the ancillary distributional effects that pertain to the more realistic 
mechanism that we shall describe in what follows. What we find is that there are 
significant monetary gains that can be obtained by moving away from the sales tax, two 
estimates for which are $106.3 million and $133.9 million, per year.17 
 
Implementing the Tax Policy Change: The “One Line” Solution 
The case of an individual lump-sum tax where the government keeps all the benefits 
of the tax change, discussed in the previous section, is the only one where there are no 
distributional impacts. But such an individual lump-sum tax is not feasible, and feasible 
mechanisms for the proposed tax change are bound to have some distributional 
consequences. It should be noted, however, that this is not necessarily bad from a policy 
perspective. Because the potential tax savings that we have uncovered are the result of 
itemizing federal income tax returns, a more progressive income tax increase may allow 
for greater gains. (For a given income tax increase, a high-income earner will be more 
likely to itemize and will be able to save more from itemizing.)  
Among the many feasible ways to replace the sales tax with an income-based tax, in 
this section we illustrate two alternative approaches. What these two approaches have in 
common is simplicity: they would require one additional line in the Iowa 1040 form, a 
“sales tax replacement” line with the amount of the additional (sales-tax replacement) tax 
proportional to taxable income. The first alternative is based on the analysis of the 
previous section, and would replace the current sales tax with an income-based 
replacement tax whose rate changes according to the income class of the taxpayer. We 
refer to this scenario as the “differentiated rates” solution. The second alternative is 
simpler, and would replace the current sales tax with an income-based tax whose rate is 
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the same for everyone.  We refer to this scenario as the “flat tax” solution. For each of the 
two approaches, we report two sets of estimates: one where the state’s tax revenue 
remains the same before and after the tax policy change (the “revenue-neutral” scenario), 
and one where the average tax burden of the taxpayer remains the same (the “taxpayer-
neutral” scenario). In the first of these two polar cases, the taxpayers get all the benefits 
because of the efficiency gains arising from the tax policy change, whereas in the second 
case it is the state that captures all the benefits.  
The “Differentiated Rates” Solution 
Previously, we computed the “value” of replacing the sales tax with an income-based 
tax by assuming that there is a representative taxpayer for each income class that we 
identified. The analysis of that section can be readily adapted to produce income tax rates 
that would correspond to the estimated lump-sum taxes. Consider first the “revenue-
neutral” scenario. The task here is to ensure that the State of Iowa collects the same total 
tax revenue. Having determined the lump-sum tax (the tax for each taxpayer) within each 
income class, as in the previous section, and then dividing that amount by the average 
taxable income of that class produces the implicit tax rate for that class. The procedure 
for the “taxpayer-neutral” scenario is essentially the same (what is different is the 
estimated level of the lump-sum tax for each class, as discussed in the previous section). 
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 5. 
For the revenue-neutral scenario, the tax rates required to replace the sales tax 
decline uniformly as the taxable income increases. This is because taxpayers with lower 
income levels spend a higher proportion of their income on goods and services that are 
subject to the sales tax. Indeed, that is the reason why the sales tax is commonly 
perceived to be “regressive.” The pattern is similar for the taxpayer-neutral scenario. But 
because here the task is to hold constant the total tax burden of the representative 
taxpayer for each class, the interplay of federal and state marginal income tax rates is 
important. It turns out that the tax rates required to replace the sales tax for this scenario 
decline as taxable income increases, up to the AGI level of $40,000, after which the rate 
is essentially flat (and approximately equal to 3 percent).  
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TABLE 5. Estimated distribution of tax rates to replace the sales tax revenue-neutral 
and taxpayer-neutral scenarios 
AGI Bracket ($) Revenue-Neutral Tax (%) Taxpayer-Neutral Tax (%) 
Less than 10,000 11.30 11.34 
10,000 to 20,000 4.99 5.06 
20,000 to 30,000 3.85 3.94 
30,000 to 40000 3.32 3.49 
40,000 to 50,000 2.87 3.01 
50,000 to 70,000 2.77 3.07 
70,000 and over 2.26 3.07 
Source: Authors’ calculations. See the Appendix for details. 
 
In some sense, the solution illustrated in Table 5 is the one with the most limited 
distributional consequences. By construction, the rates in Table 5 would ensure that no 
“representative taxpayer” is negatively affected by replacing the sales tax with an 
income-based tax. Of course, this procedure does not account for the heterogeneity of 
taxpayers within each AGI class. So, although taxpayers are not negatively affected on 
average, it is possible that some may lose while others experience a (larger) gain. Perhaps 
more important, the differentiated tax rates in Table 5 may not be very appealing to 
policymakers, as they may be perceived as being discriminatory toward lower income 
taxpayers (although, in fact, these rates essentially mimic the effects of the current sales 
tax). For that reason, in the next section we consider the single-rate (flat tax) alternative.  
The “Flat Tax” Solution  
With this alternative, the sales tax is replaced with an income tax calculated by 
applying a flat rate (a rate which is the same for all taxpayers) to taxable income. 
Consider first the “revenue-neutral” scenario. Our calculations (see the Appendix) show 
that, in order to maintain the same total tax revenue, the current 5 percent tax on sales 
would have to be replaced with a 3.50 percent tax on income. The new marginal income 
tax rates that would result are shown in Table 6.  
It is important to emphasize again that, in the proposal of this study, the current 
income tax structure is taken as given. Thus, the final rates comprise both the old 
marginal tax rates and sales tax replacement. Because the sales tax would be replaced 
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TABLE 6. The effect of the sales-tax-replacement equivalent flat tax on the statutory 
marginal tax rates 
Taxable Income 
($) 
Current  
Marginal Tax Rate 
(%) 
Flat Tax 
Equivalent 
to Sales Tax (%) 
Total  
Marginal Tax Rate 
(%) 
0 to 1,162 0.36 3.50 3.86 
1,162 to 2,324 0.72 3.50 4.22 
2,324 to 4,648 2.43 3.50 5.93 
4,648 to 10,458 4.50 3.50 8.00 
10,458 to 17,430 6.12 3.50 9.62 
17,430 to 23,240 6.48 3.50 9.98 
23,240 to 34,860 6.80 3.50 10.30 
34,860 to 52,290 7.92 3.50 11.42 
52,290 and over 8.98 3.50 12.48 
Source: The first column is from the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance (November 2001), whereas 
the last two columns arise from the authors’ calculations (see the Appendix for details). 
 
 
 
with an income tax, this change would tend to benefit people who spend a larger portion 
of their income. Consequently, an added distributional effect occurs in this scenario 
because low-income taxpayers tend to spend a larger percentage of their income than do 
high-income taxpayers. Figure 8 shows the average tax burden (from income and sales 
tax only) before and after the sales tax replacement. Although the net benefit to Iowa 
taxpayers is $141.4 million dollars annually (in 2002 dollars), Figure 8 shows that 
replacing the sales tax with a flat tax also has a progressive distributional impact in which 
low-income taxpayers have a lower average tax rate, whereas high-income taxpayers 
actually have a higher average tax rate.  
Although the high-income taxpayers obtain the greatest benefit from itemizing the 
deductions on their federal returns, this does not fully counteract the increased average 
tax rate. Conversely, the low-income taxpayers obtain the least benefit from itemizing the 
deductions on their federal returns, but the gains from the sales tax elimination more than 
counteract the losses from the income tax increase. The result is that the average member 
of the lowest income group gains $274 on his or her tax return whereas the average 
member of the highest income group loses $380. Table 7 shows the calculated 
distribution of savings by income bracket. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. See the Appendix for details. 
 
FIGURE 8. Average tax rates before and after sales tax replacement by flat tax 
equivalent 
 
 
  
TABLE 7. Distribution of savings due to itemizing the revenue-neutral flat tax 
AGI Bracket ($) Total Savings ($) 
Savings 
Per Return ($) 
Savings as a 
Percentage of AGI 
(%) 
Less than 10,000 121,832,006 274 5.12 
10,000 to 20,000 75,198,360 182 1.17 
20,000 to 30,000 31,099,388 85 0.33 
30,000 to 40,000 -1,312,961 -5 -0.02 
40,000 to 50,000 -22,275,043 -164 -0.36 
50,000 to 70,000 -17,050,760 -168 -0.30 
70,000 and over -46,052,774 -380 -0.28 
All returns  141,438,217 77 0.26 
Source: Authors’ calculations. See the Appendix for details. 
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The flat tax equivalent replacement of the sales tax can also be set such that the state 
captures the efficiency gains made possible by the federal deduction provision. Thus, in 
this scenario, the total tax burden on Iowans remains the same and the state receives the 
additional revenue that is generated. For this case, we estimate that the 5 percent sales tax 
would have to be replaced with a 3.89 percent income tax (see the Appendix for detail). 
As in the previous scenario, replacing the sales tax (which tends to be regressive) 
with a proportional income-based tax creates a distributional effect in which the poor 
benefit more than do wealthier taxpayers. Overall, the total tax bill for Iowans will be 
unchanged, but taxpayers will be paying more money to the state government and less 
money to the federal government. The net benefit to the Iowa state government is 
estimated to be $157 million annually (in 2002 dollars). Table 8 shows the calculated 
distribution of savings by income bracket. Again, when the state captures the efficiency 
gains of the tax reform, the estimated value of the policy change is greater than the 
corresponding value that applies when the taxpayers capture the efficiency gains.18 
 
Ancillary Reasons to Favor the Proposed Tax Change 
Despite the obvious benefits of replacing the sales tax with an income tax, any 
changes in Iowa tax law are likely to encounter some opposition from Iowa’s citizens and 
legislators. Novelties are seldom welcome in this arena, as illustrated by the maxim “an 
old tax is a good tax.” But the question naturally arises: whom or what is the old tax good 
 
TABLE 8. Distribution of savings due to itemizing the taxpayer neutral flat tax  
AGI Bracket ($) Total Savings ($) 
Savings 
Per Return ($) 
Savings as a 
Percentage of AGI 
(%) 
Less than 10,000 115,913,619 260 4.87 
10,000 to 20,000 56,718,327 137 0.88 
20,000 to 30,000 3,529,411 10 0.04 
30,000 to 40,000 -26,002,574 -106 -0.30 
40,000 to 50,000 -39,232,454 -289 -0.64 
50,000 to 70,000 -31,720,380 -313 -0.56 
70,000 and over -79,205,949 -654 -0.49 
Total 0 0.00 0.00 
Source: Authors’ calculations. See the Appendix for details. 
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for? In this study we have endeavored to show that the “old” sales tax may, in fact, not be 
a good tax, not for Iowans at least. In support of the proposed tax change we have 
provided estimates of substantial statewide efficiency gains. But there are other ancillary 
advantages that should be noted when assessing the proposal put forth in this study. 
First, elimination of sales taxes may have some positive impact on local retailing and 
have a general pro-business effect, as the reduction in retail prices would make locally 
sold goods and services more attractive to Iowans and out-of-state residents.  
Second, the sales tax is becoming a less and less effective instrument for state tax 
collection, because of the rise of Internet commerce and because of an additional trend 
toward an eroded sales tax base.19 Bruce and Fox (2001) estimate the total loss in U.S. 
states and local tax revenue due to e-commerce in year 2001 to be $ 13.3 billion, and, 
perhaps more important, they forecast that this loss will increase fourfold by 2011. But 
regardless of Internet commerce, there has been a trend that is eroding the sales tax base 
nationwide, namely that whereas sales taxes predominantly target goods, a larger and 
increasing portion of consumer expenditures is allocated to services.  
Third, eliminating the sales tax would reduce the cost of collecting tax revenue (for 
both businesses and the state government) and the cost of monitoring tax compliance. 
And, because the sales tax would be replaced with an income-based tax within an already 
existing income-tax collection system, essentially no new burden would be required at 
the collection and monitoring stage. 
One potential shortcoming of the income-based tax that we are proposing is that 
income taxes are known to distort the labor market. Specifically, an increased income tax 
may adversely affect people’s willingness to work, resulting in a lower supply of labor 
and an increased consumption of “leisure,” the quintessential untaxed good. The 
empirical extent of this distortion, and its applicability to the case studied here, is unclear.  
Finally, a recognized useful feature of the current sales tax system is that it 
provides for “local options” to raise tax revenue. Whereas this flexibility is definitely 
desirable, it is clear that such local options could also be easily implemented within an 
income-based equivalent tax. Indeed, a similar option is already present in the current 
Iowa income tax: the school district surtax is calculated as a percentage of the 
taxpayer’s Iowa income tax liability. 
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Conclusion 
In this study we have proposed a tax policy change that holds the potential of 
considerable benefits to Iowa taxpayers. The reason is that Internal Revenue Service rules 
allow state income taxes to be deducted when computing taxable income from the federal 
perspective, and an equivalent deductibility is not present for sales taxes. Because of that, 
sales taxes constitute an “inferior” technology for raising state tax revenue. Thus, 
replacing the sales tax with an income-based tax could improve the efficiency of Iowa tax 
revenue collection in a sizeable way. For example, if the state were to adopt the taxpayer-
neutral flat tax, which is equivalent to the existing sales tax, we estimated that the State of 
Iowa would increase its revenue by $157 million per year, without increasing the overall 
tax burden on Iowans. 
The magnitudes of the benefits of the policy change presented here are, of course 
estimates. The methodology employed to compute such estimates could be refined, and a 
more complete database could be developed in an attempt to get more accurate estimates. 
Alternative experiments with different computational procedures have shown that the 
estimated gains do not change significantly. Overall, our assumptions and procedure 
actually provide somewhat conservative estimates, and a more complete methodology is 
likely to yield slightly larger benefits for the scenarios analyzed here.  
The recent recession and revenue shortfall have forced the governor and the state 
legislators to cut or limit a variety of worthwhile services and programs. Replacing the 
sales tax with an income-based tax, as proposed in this paper, could contribute positively 
to mitigating the current financial problems confronting the State of Iowa. To illustrate 
further the magnitude of our estimated efficiency gains, we note that $157 million dollars 
in additional revenue could translate to annual salaries for more than 5,600 new teachers; 
or, it could translate to more than 1.7 times the state funding of the University of 
Northern Iowa; or, it could provide approximately 1.4 times the state’s current spending 
on substance abuse programs.20 The federal government assumes the only major loss 
under the proposed policy change. Replacing the state sales tax with an income-based tax 
would seem to be unquestionably a positive change for Iowans.
  
 
Appendix 
Methodology and Sources of Data 
 
The analyses that we carried out relied primarily on tax data from the Iowa 
Department of Revenue and Finance and from the Internal Revenue Service. We also 
made use of the Consumer Expenditure Survey and the Consumer Price Index, both of 
which are published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
Table 9 shows information about federal income tax returns that were filed by 
Iowans. The data were used for the purpose of calculating the average marginal tax rate 
for each income group and for calculating the percentage of taxpayers in each group that 
itemizes their federal deductions. In order to calculate the average marginal tax rate, the 
average taxable income per return was computed for each income bracket. After this was 
completed, the portion of tax returns that were joint returns, single returns, and head of 
household returns were calculated. For each type of return, the average taxable income in 
each bracket was matched with the statutory marginal tax rate that applies. The average 
marginal tax rate was then calculated by averaging the statutory marginal tax rates of the 
three types of returns. The percentage of taxpayers that itemized their deductions was 
found by dividing the number of itemized returns by the total returns count.  
Tables 10 and 11 show state income tax data for 1999, which is the most recent state 
data that is currently available. Table 10 shows a breakdown of state income taxes paid 
by residents versus state income taxes paid by nonresidents. Table 11 shows only 
information on all taxpayers but in more detail. The information in Table 10 was 
necessary because nonresidents must report all income to the State of Iowa even though 
they are required to pay taxes only on Iowa income. If this discrepancy is not considered, 
the calculated average and marginal tax rates will be incorrect. In order to find the portion 
of reported AGI and taxable income for which nonresidents must pay taxes, a series of 
calculations were required. Definitions used are listed below. 
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AGI = adjusted gross income (as defined by the Internal Revenue Service) 
TI = taxable income 
AGI per return = all taxpayer AGI/number of returns 
Nonres AGI = all AGI – resident AGI 
Resident TI = resident AGI * all taxpayer TI/all taxpayer AGI 
Nonres TI = nonres AGI * all taxpayer TI/all taxpayer AGI 
Nonres taxes paid = all taxpayer taxes paid – resident taxes paid 
Number of nonres returns21 = AGI per return * nonres AGI 
Number of resident returns = all taxpayer returns – number of nonres returns 
Ave. resident TI = resident TI/number of resident returns 
Ave. resident tax bill = resident tax paid/number of resident returns 
Ave. marginal resident tax rate = statutory marginal rate for the calculated average TI 
Ave. marginal nonres tax rate = ave. marginal resident tax rate 
Ave. nonres tax bill = nonres tax paid/number of nonres returns 
Ave. effective nonres TI = ave. nonres tax bill * ave. resident TI/ave. resident tax bill 
Effective nonres TI = ave. effective nonres TI * number of nonres returns 
Effective nonres AGI = effective nonres TI/nonres TI * nonres AGI 
All taxpayer effective AGI = effective nonres AGI + resident AGI 
All taxpayer effective TI = effective nonres TI + resident TI 
Ave. tax rate = all taxpayer tax paid/all taxpayer effective TI 
 
After income tax values had been calculated it became necessary to calculate the amount of 
money each income group spent on the sales tax. Since sales tax returns are not reported to the 
state in terms of individual payments, the consumer expenditure survey was used to estimate 
individual payments.22 The survey gives information about the spending habits of people by 
income groups. By examining each expense, and adding the amount spent on each taxable item, 
it is possible to find the amount of money each income group spends on taxable items, as 
illustrated in Table 12.23 It is then possible to find the amount paid as sales taxes by the 
representative consumer in each group facing a 5 percent sales tax rate (as applies in Iowa), and 
these estimates are reported in the last row of Table 12. Because Iowans are not exactly like the 
individuals represented in the national survey, this figure must be modified to reflect the fact that 
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adjusted gross income within each group in Iowa differs slightly from its national counterpart 
and also the fact that spending patterns here differ slightly. Specifically, for FY 1999, income 
before taxes for midwesterners was 95.5 percent of average nationwide income before taxes, but 
average expenditures for midwesterners was 98.1 percent of average nationwide expenditures, 
indicating that midwesterners spend a greater percentage of their income.24 Thus, taxable 
spending for each income cohort within Iowa was estimated by (i) multiplying the figure 
obtained in Table 12 by 1.027 to reflect the greater average spending propensity of Iowans, and 
(ii) multiplying this figure by the ratio of average Iowa income to average national income 
within each group. Finally, the Iowa sales tax rate of 5 percent was applied to this spending 
figure to estimate sales tax paid by each group. The total sales taxes imputed to Iowa by this 
method differed from the total actual Iowa sales tax revenue by (only) 3.46 percent, so each 
group’s estimated sales tax was scaled upward to reflect total sales tax revenue.25 
For the lump-sum equivalent tax scenario, the sales tax expenditures for each group were 
treated as though they were income tax payments. In order to find how much money would be 
saved by itemizing, those payments were multiplied by the portion of taxpayers that itemized 
their federal tax returns and the federal marginal tax rate that those people paid. With the 
decrease in federal income taxes, Iowans were no longer able to deduct as much from their state 
income taxes. It was then necessary to multiply the federal tax savings by the state marginal tax 
rates in order to find the requisite increase in state taxes. This tax increase in turn was multiplied 
by the federal marginal tax rates in order to find the decrease in federal taxes caused by the 
second increase in state taxes. This process was iterated fifteen times in order to find a 
reasonable approximation of the net savings to each income group.26 The result was the total 
savings to Iowa taxpayers for 1999 if the entire sales tax was converted. This, however, resulted 
in the state government revenue increasing by almost $8 million. In order to make the revenue 
effects neutral, a small portion of the sales tax was eliminated but not converted to an income-
based tax. The revenue-neutral lump-sum equivalent tax scenario calculations were then repeated 
taking this change into account. The calculations are shown in Table 13.  
For the taxpayer-neutral lump-sum equivalent tax scenario, the entire sales tax was 
converted to an income-based tax. Then, after all effects due to itemizing were calculated, the 
state income tax was increased by the amount of the net savings from itemizing for each group. 
Next, savings from itemizing were calculated for that tax increase. This process was completed 
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fifteen times, so that the total savings from itemizing was totally counteracted by the income tax 
increases. The sum of all savings from itemizing and incidental revenue increases is the total 
revenue increase for the state government for 1999. The taxpayer-neutral lump-sum equivalent 
tax scenario calculations are shown in Table 14. In order to adjust the dollar values from these 
scenarios to 2002 dollars, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) was used. The average CPI for 2002 
was divided by the average CPI for 1999 in order to obtain the inflation rate for the three-year 
period. That inflation rate was multiplied by each of the 1999 savings in order to find the 2002 
savings.27 The CPI data is shown in Table 15. For the flat tax equivalent scenarios, the first step 
was to increase the average marginal tax rates and average tax rates in order to reflect the income 
tax increase. After that was completed, the immediate increase in state income taxes was 
calculated by multiplying the tax increase by the total effective taxable income for each group. 
Finding the total money saved then required an iterative process similar to the one used in the 
lump sum equivalent tax scenario. Table 16 shows the iterations for the scenario in which the 
government breaks even. The results were then adjusted to 2002 values using the CPI data from 
Table 15.
  
 
 
TABLE 9. Tax Year 1999, United States selected income and tax items for individual income tax returns: Forms 1040, 
1040A & 1040EZ, (amounts are in thousands of dollars): State of Iowa, by Size of Adjusted Gross Income, Filing/ 
Processing Period: Jan 1, 2000 to Dec 31, 2000 
 Size of Adjusted Gross Income 
Iowa 
Total 
Returns 
Breakeven 
and Loss 
$0.01 
Under 
$10,000 
$10,000 
Under 
$20,000 
$20,000 
Under 
$30,000 
$30,000 
Under 
$50,000 
$50,000 
Under 
$75,000 
$75,000 
Under 
$100,000 
$75,000 
and 
Over 
Returns count  1,345,040  
                       
11,793  
                     
287,300  
                 
243,545  
                  
200,760  
                
266,485  
                  
194,818  
                      
73,774  
                   
140,339  
Joint return count 605,488 5,782  19,697 56,187 67,113 161,696 168,011 67,226 127,002 
Single return 
count 612,820 5,433 243,672 146,409 102,029 82,266 21,734 5,517 11,277 
Head of 
household 111,366 348 21,356 36,581 27,613 19,499 4,334 834 1,635 
AGI amount  52,170,593     -572,703  1,433,422       3,648,359      4,961,037    10,469,311     11,853,694     6,291,737  
     
20,377,473  
Total Itemized Deductions: 
No. of returns 381,460         1,791     6,742  22,363   30,902    84,302   114,155    60,171     121,205  
Amount  5,846,823       29,463      149,755   328,228     311,350   911,388  1,379,130    895,586    2,737,510  
Taxable Income: 
No. of returns 1,118,131      0           118,509    202,602       196,739    265,372     194,643          73,745         140,266  
Amount        35,642,254         0      212,284  1,299,702    2,679,566  6,656,447  8,354,099  4,686,788  16,440,154  
Income Tax: 
No. of returns 1,071,533     41           114,859      181,394         181,319     259,319      194,341         73,732         140,260  
Amount 6,670,191             360          30,412    174,342       357,411   917,544  1,248,007     853,652  3,942,116  
Average TI $26,499.03 $0.00 $738.89 $5,336.60 $13,347.11 $24,978.69 $42,881.56 $63,528.99 $117,146.01 
Average tax bill $4,959.10 $30.53 $105.85 $715.85 $1,780.29 $3,443.14 $6,406.01 $11,571.18 $28,089.95 
Ave tax rate 18.71% - 14.33% 13.41% 13.34% 13.78% 14.94% 18.21% 23.98% 
% joint returns 45.54% 50.00% 6.92% 23.49% 34.11% 61.37% 86.57% 91.37% 90.77% 
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TABLE 9. Continued 
Iowa 
Total 
Returns 
Breakeven 
and Loss 
$0.01 
Under 
$10,000 
$10,000 
Under 
$20,000 
$20,000 
Under 
$30,000 
$30,000 
Under 
$50,000 
$50,000 
Under 
$75,000 
$75,000 
Under 
$100,000 
75,000 
and 
Over 
Joint return marg 
rate(*) 15.00% 15.00% 15.00% 15.00% 15.00% 15.00% 15.00% 27.50% 30.50% 
Single returns 46.09% 46.99% 85.58% 61.21% 51.86% 31.23% 11.20% 7.50% 8.06% 
Single return 
marg rate(*) 15.00% 15.00% 15.00% 15.00% 15.00% 15.00% 27.50% 27.50% 30.50% 
% head of 
household  8.38% 3.01% 7.50% 15.29% 14.03% 7.40% 2.23% 1.13% 1.17% 
Head of 
household 
marg rate(*) 15.00% 15.00% 15.00% 15.00% 15.00% 15.00% 27.50% 27.50% 30.50% 
Avg marg tax 
rate 15.00% 15.00% 15.00% 15.00% 15.00% 15.00% 16.68% 27.50% 30.50% 
Source: U.S. Internal Revenue Service, July 2001. 
Note: (*) These rates are from the 2001 tax rate schedule. 
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TABLE 10. Tax Year 1999, Iowa income tax incidence for residents 
  All Taxpayers Resident Taxpayers 
Adjusted 
Gross ($) 
Income 
Class ($) AGI ($) Tax Paid ($) AGI ($) Tax Paid ($) 
No AGI  0 209,763 0 0 
0 5,000 554,583,737 250,496 527,100,000 240,000 
5,000 10,000 1,705,408,510 9,834,509 1,607,100,000 9,500,000 
10,000 14,000 1,979,064,973 28,593,061 1,842,200,000 27,500,000 
14,000 20,000 4,210,714,233 92,286,464 3,924,400,000 89,000,000 
20,000 25,000 4,387,618,379 126,600,055 4,101,600,000 122,500,000 
25,000 30,000 4,674,985,430 152,118,999 4,378,400,000 147,500,000 
30,000 40,000 8,471,729,375 296,749,962 7,895,000,000 288,200,000 
40,000 50,000 6,037,607,185 221,510,700 5,528,400,000 214,700,000 
50,000 75,000 7,561,276,275 288,169,672 6,636,600,000 276,800,000 
75,000 And over 29,295,367,654 655,423,752 12,345,300,000 603,100,000 
Total  68,878,355,751 1,871,747,433 48,786,100,000 1,779,000,000 
Source: Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance, July 2001. 
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TABLE 11. Tax year 1999, Iowa selected income and tax items for individual income 
tax returns by size of adjusted gross income 
Source: Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance, July 2001. 
 
Adjusted Gross 
Income Brackets 
($) 
No. of 
Returns 
Adjusted 
Gross Income ($) 
Nt Taxable 
Income ($) 
Tax 
Paid ($) 
NO  AGI 23768 0 2209332 209,763 
1 5,000 192,255 554,583,737 287,322,127 250,496 
5,000 10,000 229,367 1,705,408,510 1,192,660,066 9,834,509 
10,000 14,000 165,042 1,979,064,973 1,475,893,017 28,593,061 
14,000 20,000 247,840 4,210,714,233 3,248,976,370 92,286,464 
20,000 25,000 195,396 4,387,618,379 3,444,705,849 126,600,055 
25,000 30,000 170,462 4,674,985,430 3,669,118,128 152,118,999 
30,000 40,000 244,998 8,471,729,375 6,555,529,016 296,749,962 
40,000 50,000 135,770 6,037,607,185 4,573,329,652 221,510,700 
50,000 75,000 126,665 7,561,276,275 5,578,209,735 288,169,672 
75,000 
And 
Over 95,868 29,295,367,654 19,938,983,448 655,423,752 
Total  1,827,431 68,878,355,751 49,966,936,740 1,871,747,433 
Non-Resident 
Total 145,156 20,092,269,436 13,789,722,464 89,565,625 
  
TABLE 12. Consumer expenditure survey data (U.S. national data, year 1999) 
Item 
Less Than  
$10,000  
$10,000 to  
$20,000 
$20,000 to 
$30,000 
$30,000 to 
$40,000 
$40,000 to 
$50,000 
$50,000 to 
$70,000 
$70,000  
and Over 
Number of consumer units (in 
thousands)  11,497 15,634 11,560 9,453 7,381 10,999 15,168 
Income before taxes ($)  5,592 14,563 24,467 34,353 44,321 58,473 113,441 
Income after taxes ($) 5,420 14,295 23,487 32,458 41,405 54,073 102,616 
Average annual expenditures 
($) 15,962 21,794 28,916 35,048 40,826 49,606 76,742 
Food away from home ($) 864 1,092 1,625 2,142 2,365 2,803 4,398 
Alcoholic beverages ($) 158 191 267 292 345 443 696 
Maint, repairs, ins, other ($)  358 584 768 748 766 1,002 1,869 
Utilities, fuels, and public 
services ($) 1,440 1,878 2,159 2,298 2,491 2,795 3,412 
Other household expenses ($) 130 190 213 207 271 359 965 
Housekeeping supplies ($) 251 313 451 515 575 784 945 
Household furnishings and 
equipment ($) 560 821 1,127 1,343 1,549 2,188 3,431 
Apparel and services ($) 799 1,100 1,553 1,904 1,677 2,139 3,625 
Other vehicles ($) 0 6 14 86 43 33 75 
Other vehicle expenses ($) 790 1,280 1,781 2,296 2,610 3,145 4,322 
Vehicle finance charges ($) 84 128 237 360 414 533 585 
Maintenance and repairs ($) 285 494 576 705 811 870 1,200 
Vehicle insurance ($) 279 473 677 798 870 1,050 1,308 
Entertainment ($) 733 989 1,323 1,681 1,882 2,754 4,121 
Personal care products and 
services ($) 224 247 385 452 500 525 794 
Reading ($) 68 104 132 147 166 209 330 
Education ($) 527 262 309 347 425 602 1,430 
Tobacco products and 
smoking supplies ($) 235 274 305 336 376 391 328 
                
Estimated taxable spending ($) 7,785.28 10,425.48 13,902.00 16,657.00 18,136.00 22,625.00 33,834.00 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, May 2001. 
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TABLE 13. Net savings due to itemizing the revenue-neutral lump-sum equivalent tax 
 
AGI Bracket 
Less than 
$10,000 
$10,000 to  
$20,000 
$20,000 to 
$30,000 
$30,000 to 
$40,000 
$40,000 to 
$50,000 
$50,000 to  
$70,000 
$70,000  
and Over 
1999 
Total 
Total Adjusted 
to 2002 
Money to sales 
Tax ($) 163,848,718 227,950,218 264,650,679 209,715,959 124,177,986 109,247,104 238,332,453 1,337,923,119 1,429,402,113
Part of sales tax 
not replaced by 
income tax ($) 3,691 126,526 349,510 617,156 379,270 784,364 4,820,571 7,081,088 7,620,681
Decrease in 
federal taxes 1 
($) 576,737 3,137,914 6,102,387 9,922,199 5,874,522 10,600,230 61,510,744 97,724,732 105,171,550
Increase in state 
taxes 1 ($) 21,641 176,145 384,796 674,710 399,467 839,538 5,448,909 7,945,206 8,550,647
Decrease in 
federal taxes 2 
($) 3,246 26,422 57,719 101,206 59,920 140,026 1,661,917 2,050,457 2,206,706
Increase in state 
taxes 2 ($) 122 1,483 3,640 6,882 4,075 11,090 147,220 174,512 187,810
Decrease in 
federal taxes 3 
($) 18 222 546 1,032 611 1,850 44,902 49,182 52,930
   
Net savings to 
taxpayers ($) 561,928 3,113,444 6,121,698 9,959,942 5,910,745 10,675,718 62,439,165 98,782,640 106,310,073
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TABLE 14. Total tax increase by income group for taxpayer-neutral lump-sum equivalent tax 
AGI Bracket 
Less than 
$10,000 
$10,000 to 
$20,000 
$20,000 to 
$30,000 
$30,000 to 
$40,000 
$40,000 to 
$50,000 
$50,000 to 
$70,000 
$70,000  
and Over 
1999 
TOTAL 
2002 Adjusted 
Total 
Savings from 
itemizing initial 
($) 558,250 2,988,578 5,779,821 9,370,361 5,548,421 9,962,884 58,808,060 93,016,375 100,104,407
Incidental Increase 
in tax revenue 1 
($) 21,764 177,740 388,984 683,674 404,820 856,929 5,715,827 8,249,739 8,878,385
Savings from 
itemizing 1 ($) 1,902 39,182 126,228 418,679 247,910 908,574 14,510,772 16,253,247 17,491,777
Incidental Increase 
in tax revenue 2 
($) 74 2,330 8,495 30,547 18,088 78,148 1,410,369 1,548,052 1,666,017
Savings from 
itemizing 2 ($) 6 514 2,757 18,707 11,077 82,858 3,580,504 3,696,423 3,978,098
 
Total ($) 581,997 3,208,381 6,306,535 10,524,272 6,231,681 11,905,551 85,660,427 124,418,845 133,899,808
 
 
 
 
TABLE 15. Consumer Price Index (Midwest urban) 
Year CPI 
1999 162.7 
2000 168.3 
2001 172.8 
2002 175.1* 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, June 2002. 
* Estimate for 2002 is based on a linear regression using monthly data for the period 1987-2002. 
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TABLE 16. Change in income tax revenue and money saved itemizing for the revenue-neutral flat tax equivalent scenario 
Adjusted Gross 
Income Class 
Immediate 
Increase in 
Income Taxes 
($) 
Money Saved 
Itemizing 
Federal  
Taxes 1 ($) 
Change in  
IncomeTax  
Revenue After 
Itemizing 1 ($) 
Money Saved 
Itemizing 
Federal Taxes 2 
($) 
Change in 
Income Tax 
Revenue After 
Itemizing 2 ($) 
Money Saved 
Itemizing 
Federal Taxes 15 
($) 
Money Saved 
Itemizing 
Federal Taxes 
Adjusted to 2002 ($) 
No AGI 77,432 1,764 77,500 1,774 77,500 1,774 1,909.42 
$0 to $5,000 9,957,551 35,051 9,959,032 35,273 9,959,041 35,274 37,962.22 
$5,000 to 
$10,000 40,777,356 143,537 40,788,846 145,260 40,788,984 145,281 156,352.00 
$10,000 to 
$14,000 50,063,176 689,542 50,118,372 697,821 50,119,035 697,922 751,104.71 
$14,000 to 
$20,000 110,045,145 1,515,699 110,191,027 1,537,581 110,193,133 1,537,902 1,655,093.20 
$20,000 to 
$25,000 116,636,167 2,692,985 116,895,361 2,731,864 116,899,103 2,732,433 2,940,650.18 
$25,000 to 
$30,000 124,207,306 2,867,793 124,493,648 2,910,744 124,497,937 2,911,397 3,133,251.70 
$30,000 to 
$40,000 220,466,869 10,461,638 221,544,917 10,623,345 221,561,580 10,625,884 11,435,597.71 
$40,000 to 
$50,000 151,421,872 7,185,301 152,162,301 7,296,365 152,173,746 7,298,109 7,854,239.60 
$50,000 to 
$75,000 178,643,162 17,459,070 180,637,819 17,791,758 180,675,828 17,798,221 19,154,480.36 
$75,000 and  
over 320,034,937 84,302,293 330,559,879 87,512,401 330,960,654 87,639,476 94,317,777.85 
Total  1,322,330,973 127,354,673 1,337,428,702 131,284,188 1,337,906,541 131,423,674 141,438,418.96 
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Endnotes 
1. For example, if a sales tax brings the total price of a good above a consumer’s 
willingness to pay, the consumer will choose not to consume the taxed product. In that 
case, the government does not collect anything while the consumer is worse off because 
he or she is forced to allocate income to a less desirable consumption bundle. The only 
tax believed to be nondistortionary is a lump-sum tax (i.e., a fixed amount levied on an 
individual irrespective of any economic decision he or she makes), but differential 
lump-sum taxes also are widely considered infeasible on grounds of equity. 
 
2. Contributions in this area include Ramsey 1927, Mirrlees 1971, Diamond and 
Mirrlees 1971, and Atkinson and Stiglitz 1976. For a textbook presentation of 
alternative models and results, see Myles 1995.  
 
3. The logic for this deduction, it seems, is that taxes paid to the state government are 
not discretionary and therefore are not available as income to the taxpayer.  
 
4. In general, a tax schedule is said to be “progressive” or “regressive” according to 
whether the tax burden is borne relatively more by the wealthy or by the poor. More 
specifically, a tax schedule is said to be “progressive” if the average tax rate increases 
as taxable income rises and regressive otherwise.  
 
5. For a full list of services that are subject to the Iowa sales tax go to 
http://www.state.ia.us/tax/educate/78539.html. 
 
6. For a complete list of cities in Iowa and their respective local option sales taxes, go to 
http://www.state.ia.us/tax/business/lostcit.pdf. 
 
7. This figure represents tax return data for consistency with the rest of the analysis, 
although it is recognized that a distribution of households’ income may be somewhat 
more informative here.  
 
8. For more information regarding the distribution of state tax burdens, see Ettlinger et 
al. 1996. 
 
9. Missouri also allows a federal income tax deduction, but unlike Iowa’s, it is not 
unlimited. Missouri law allows for a maximum federal income tax deduction of 
$5,000 for single returns and $10,000 for joint returns. 
 
10. The sales tax data for Figures 5 and 6 include local option sales tax revenue that is 
collected by the state and then redistributed to the local municipality. The local option 
sales taxes are not, however, included in later analyses because they constitute a local 
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tax instead of a state tax. Local option sales taxes generally account for approximately 
10 percent of gross sales tax collections. 
 
11. For a more thorough discussion on trends in state taxes, see the Center for Budget and 
Policy Priorities 2002. For more information on the distributional effects of Iowa’s 
sales tax increase and income tax decrease, see Fisher and Bruner 2002. 
 
12. The state sales tax deduction was eliminated from federal law in 1986 as part of an 
effort to simplify federal income taxes. Lawmakers eliminated a variety of deductions 
and replaced them with greater personal exemptions and a larger standard deduction. 
In April 2002, Congressman Bryant of Tennessee introduced a bill to allow taxpayers 
the option to deduct either sales or income taxes from their federal tax returns. For 
more information on the bill, see Bryant 2002. 
 
13. This value is based on the authors’ calculations using state and federal income tax 
data. A similar result can be found in Slocum et al. 1998. 
 
14. There is actually an additional economic reason suggesting that the taxpayer could in 
fact benefit from a lump-sum tax replacing the sales tax, even without the considera-
tions related to the federal deduction. Because currently some goods and services are 
not taxed, eliminating the sales taxes would in fact affect relative prices, and the 
taxpayer/consumer could actually benefit by changing their purchasing decisions. 
Although this argument does strengthen our point here, in this study we ignore such 
second-order effects because they are likely to be small relative to the main impact 
that we are interested in quantifying. 
 
15. As the individual’s federal tax liabilities are reduced, the individual’s income that is 
taxable from the State of Iowa’s perspective increases, which would, ceteris paribus, 
actually result in higher revenues than Iowa’s current income tax structure provides. 
In all calculations subsequently presented, we account for such induced effects. 
 
16. The most recent available data was for tax year 1999. These data were used to 
calculate a net benefit of $98.8 million for this scenario. The value was then adjusted 
to 2002 dollars using the consumer price index. This inflation adjustment will tend to 
underestimate the actual value because it does not account for real growth in the state 
of Iowa. 
 
17. The fact that such gains would constitute a flow that Iowa taxpayers would enjoy 
indefinitely should also be stressed. Because of that, the present-value concept (i.e., 
the discounted accumulation of all future gains in this flow) would perhaps be a more 
appropriate criterion for assessing the value of the policy change being advocated. 
For example, with a 5 percent discount rate, the present value of all future net benefits 
arising from replacing the sales tax is in excess of $2 billion! 
 
18. The logic for this was discussed earlier, and here it works as follows. Were the 
government to set the sales replacement tax rate at 3.85 percent, it would raise exactly 
the amount captured by taxpayers in the preceding scenario ($141.4 million 
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annually). But in such a case, the increase in state income tax would allow itemizing 
taxpayers to decrease their federal tax burdens. Accordingly, for the Iowa government 
to leave the total tax burden unchanged, the Iowa tax rate can be increased further, 
specifically to 3.89 percent, such that the total additional revenue obtained by the 
state is estimated to be $157 million annually.  
 
19. A list of Iowa sales tax exemptions, and the dates that they were enacted, can be 
found at http://www.state.ia.us/tax/educate/79120.html.  
 
20. Iowa government spending information can be found at 
http://staffweb.legis.state.ia.us/lfb/factbook/Iowa_Factbook_2001.pdf or 
http://staffweb.legis.state.ia.us/lfb/miscpubs/ladar_fy2003.pdf 
 
21. The given equation was not adequate for the lowest income bracket or the highest 
income bracket. Those brackets were calculated separately. For the lowest income 
bracket, the equation was number of nonres returns = all taxpayer returns * total 
nonres returns/total all taxpayer returns. For the highest income bracket, the equation 
was number of nonres returns = total nonres returns – sum of other brackets’ nonres 
returns.  
 
22. A similar procedure was used by Swenson (1999). 
 
23. The information in Table 12 can be found at 
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/ce/standard/1999/income.txt. 
 
24. Because midwesterners spend 98.1 percent of the national average, while their 
income is only 95.5 percent of the national average, the average midwesterner spends 
about 2.7 percent more of their income (98.1/95.5=1.027). Information on regional 
income and expenditures can be found at 
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/ce/standard/1999/region.txt.  
 
25. The calculated sales tax revenue was $1.29 billion whereas the actual revenue was 
$1.34 billion. There could be a variety of reasons for this discrepancy, including 
differences in spending patterns between the Midwest and Iowa, unreported income, 
or spending by out-of-state visitors. 
 
26. The iterations could be continued indefinitely, but changes in the final result would be 
less than $0.01.  
 
27. Although this procedure takes inflation into account, it does not include any estimate 
of real growth. Consequently, these adjustments should tend to underestimate the 
difference between 1999 values and 2002 values. 
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